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Chronic food shortages, political repression, and the continuing weakness of the economy have driven 
tens of thousands of North Koreans to cross the border into China’s northeastern provinces.1 A distinctive 
feature of this refugee experience is the particular inhospitality of the recipient country to which they 
have fled. The Chinese government has responded to this influx with intensified surveillance of the border 
and periodic crackdowns on the refugee community, while consistently refusing to grant North Korean 
refugees asylum or to establish a process through which their refugee status claims could be processed. 
As a consequence, most of these refugees are forced to undertake an arduous journey to third countries, 
abetted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and professional smugglers.
Yet we know from data collected by the South Korean government that even those who succeed 
in getting out have often spent substantial time in China, many having fled during the peak famine years 
of the mid-1990s. Through individual testimony, open-ended interviews, and more systematic survey 
research, we are gradually gaining greater insight into the life experiences of these refugees. This growing 
body of work considers the conditions that motivated migration in the first place, conditions in China, 
particular issues such as trafficking, and the subsequent ability of refugees to assimilate once they have 
reached a third country. 
This paper extends this work by providing information from a large-scale survey of refugees 
conducted from August 2004 to February 2005 in China. A novel feature of the survey is that it provides 
insight not only into the material circumstances of the refugees but also into their psychological state and 
aspirations.
A key finding of the survey, confirmed by more detailed clinical work in South Korea, is that many 
North Korean refugees suffer severe psychological stress akin to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
This distress is caused in part by the precariousness of refugee life in China. However, we show that it 
is also a result of the long shadow cast by the North Korean famine and abuses suffered at the hands of 
North Korean authorities. These traumas, in turn, affect the ability of the refugees to hold jobs in China 
and accumulate resources for on-migration. 
Relatively few refugees want to remain in China: Most want to permanently resettle in South 
Korea, though younger, better-educated refugees have a greater inclination to prefer the United States 
as a final destination. These findings also confirm research on North Korean refugees in South Korea 
that points to substantial adjustment problems, problems that are a reminder of the difficult social and 
psychological issues that would attend any process of reunification.
The remainder of this paper follows the narrative arc of the refugees’ experiences. The first section 
outlines the nature of the survey, provides basic demographic information on the sample, and discusses its 
1. The precise number of North Koreans who have made this journey remains uncertain; estimates range from 20,000 to as high 
as 400,000. The high end of this range probably exaggerates the number currently in China (Refugees International 2005, 5–6). 
See Lee (2006, 18–19) for a summary of alternative estimates.
representativeness vis-à-vis both the North Korean and refugee populations. The second section examines 
the reasons why refugees left North Korea and outlines in somewhat more detail the risks they encounter 
in doing so. The third section focuses on how the refugees organize escape and establish lives in China. 
In the fourth and fifth sections, we extend this analysis of objective conditions to a more detailed 
consideration of the psychology of the refugees. This human dimension of the refugees’ plight is a 
recurrent theme in refugee testimony, and we find, not surprisingly, that refugees suffer from fear, 
anxiety, and other psychological problems associated with the uncertainty of their circumstances. We 
use multivariate regression techniques to generate a more nuanced portrait of the determinants of this 
psychological distress. This analysis permits us to isolate the effects of demographic factors as well as 
refugees’ experiences in both China and North Korea. We also find some evidence that women are more 
vulnerable to psychological distress than men. In the sixth section of the paper we further examine the 
refugees’ experiences in China in the context of their aspirations for the future, including preferences for 
permanent resettlement. Our findings and their relevance are summarized in the concluding section. 
 
I. WHO ARE THE REFUGEES? A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE
The survey was conducted from August 2004 to September 2005 by 48 individuals trained by one of 
the authors before conducting the interviews. 2 A total of 1,346 refugees were interviewed at 11 sites: 
Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, Yangbin, Tumen, Helong, Hunchun, Dandong, Jilin, Tonghua, and 
Wangqing. We do not claim that the sample is random. Neither we nor anyone else knows the underlying 
characteristics of the refugee population, and cluster-type techniques used in other contexts to address this 
problem were impossible to implement due to the covert nature of the survey and the underground status 
of the respondents.3 Nonetheless, we are able to compare the demographic characteristics of this sample 
against those of others in previous surveys and, with the possible exception of a bias toward refugees living 
in urban areas, believe that it is probably a reasonable reflection of the North Korean refugee population. 
However, as our subsequent analysis will show, it is possible to use multiple regression analysis to control 
for at least some possible sources of bias in sampling. 
2. As is typical in such survey work, the number of valid responses usually falls below this number, as indicated in the tables that 
follow.
3. To reduce the likelihood of interviewing the same individuals multiple times, the respondents were not paid. Given the use of 
multiple interviewers over an extended period, however, the possibility of a single individual being interviewed more than once 
cannot be categorically excluded. In the case of Shenyang, interviews were conducted on two occasions. The identities of the 
respondents in the first set of interviews were recorded, and these individuals were excluded from the second round of interviews. 
Because these refugees do not have legal status in China, in the cases where respondents were suspicious and refused to answer 
on paper, the responses were memorized by the interviewers to dissipate this anxiety. Due to the tightened security situation in 
the border region, conducting such interviews has become much more difficult, if not altogether impossible, since the interview 
period.
Along a number of important dimensions, the sample also roughly mirrors what we know about 
the North Korean adult population as a whole, albeit with two particularly salient differences: Members 
of lower-income classes and residents of the northeast provinces are both overrepresented, as has been 
the case with previous surveys conducted in both China and South Korea (cf. Robinson et al. 1999, 
2001a, 2001b; Lee et al. 2001; Chon et al. 2007).4 Most of the respondents were prime age adults; the 
median age of the respondents was 38 years. Females slightly outnumbered males, 52 to 48 percent. A 
slight majority of the sample reported high school education (53 percent), but 44 percent reported having 
only elementary education. Most respondents were laborers (54 percent), with farmers (34 percent) the 
next largest occupational group. Other reported occupations included student, trader, professional or 
technician, administrator, soldier, party official, and government official, although some of these were 
quite small in number. 
Most respondents were from North Hamgyong province (57 percent), followed by South 
Hamgyong province (19 percent). Although this distribution of responses actually makes these provinces 
somewhat less overrepresented than in earlier surveys, these provinces account for only about 24 percent 
of the North Korean population (Eberstadt and Banister 1992). There are two main reasons for this 
bias. The more obvious is proximity. The eastern end of the Tumen River has become the main route for 
egress.
Internal travel in North Korea has historically been controlled and exposes the individual to risk 
not only of harassment and mistreatment but also imprisonment. Those living closer to the border simply 
have less far to travel. 
The second reason for the overrepresentation of refugees from the northeast is that these provinces 
were hit hardest by the food shortages and famine of the 1990s (Smith 2005; Haggard and Noland 2005, 
2007). North Korea is surprisingly industrialized and urbanized for a country of its per capita income. 
As food shortages became apparent in the early 1990s, the working classes of the industrial cities in the 
northeast were particularly vulnerable to the declining ability of the public distribution system (PDS) 
to provide adequate rations (Haggard and Noland 2007, chapter 2). These traditionally food-deprived 
provinces were highly dependent on the PDS, and famine appears to have started there well before it hit 
4. A smaller survey conducted in South Korea (Y. H. Lee 2007) is an exception: The socioeconomic profile of respondents is 
decidedly more upscale. This sample may be unrepresentative (as might be inferred by comparison to a larger survey conducted 
by Chon et al. 2007), or it might reflect the fact that North Koreans from more advantaged backgrounds are more likely to have 
the resources and connections (either on their own or through family connections in South Korea) to on-migrate from China 
to a third country for ultimate settlement in South Korea. Under this second interpretation, the socioeconomic profile of our 
sample may reflect a sample selection issue: More advantaged refugees spend less time in China and are more likely to successfully 
migrate to a third country and thus escape counting in our survey. For details, see Blaine Harden, “As More Take a Chance on 
Fleeing North Korea, Routes for All Budgets,” Washington Post, November 18, 2007. Interestingly, the northeastern provinces 
are less overrepresented in our survey than in Y. H. Lee (2007). 
the rice-growing western provinces. During 1994, the North Korean government reportedly stopped 
sending food shipments to North and South Hamgyong and Ryanggang altogether. 
It is important to underscore, however, that while this overweighting of the northeast limits 
the conclusions that can be drawn from the sample with respect to the North Korean population as a 
whole, it does not necessarily present a problem for drawing inferences about the North Korean refugee 
community in China, which almost certainly is similarly skewed. In addition, we can use multivariate 
regression techniques to control for region to some extent since all provinces in the country, as well as the 
privileged capital city of Pyongyang, are represented among the respondents. 
II. MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL AND LEGAL SOURCES OF RISK 
Refugees consider leaving their homeland for diverse reasons, some having to do with the “push” factors 
associated with deprivation or persecution, others having to do with “pull” factors based on opportunities 
in the target country. Over the years, the predominant motivation for North Koreans deciding to cross 
the border into China has fluctuated somewhat. Early interviews with refugees from the famine period 
and immediately after found, not surprisingly, that hunger and the search for food was a major push 
factor (Good Friends 1999, 14). By 2002, however, a Human Rights Watch report found that hunger 
was just one of the motives for flight; others included loss of status, frustration over lack of opportunities, 
political persecution due to family history, and wish to live in similar conditions as those North Koreans 
who live outside of North Korea (Human Rights Watch 2002). Refugees debriefed in South Korea cited 
following others who had already left as yet another motive (Lee 2006, table 1).
Our survey asked refugees whether they left for economic, political, or other reasons. For this 
sample of refugees, the economy was the overwhelming reason for leaving North Korea (95 percent); 
political dissatisfaction was a very distant second (2 percent). In a narrow sense, this pattern of responses 
would appear to confirm the Chinese government’s claim that the North Koreans are “economic 
migrants” rather than refugees fearing persecution.5 However, as we will see in more detail below, 
economic circumstances in North Korea, including the distribution of food, are very closely tied to the 
political order; as a result, we should be cautious in interpreting this response.
Weighing against the various motivations for leaving are the risks of attempting exit or of being 
repatriated from China. In the case of the North Korean refugees, these risks are very substantial and 
provide insight into their psychological state. Before changes in the North Korean penal code in 2004—
just prior to the survey—a person who illegally crossed “a frontier of the Republic” faced a sentence of 
up to three years in a kwalliso, a political penal labor colony (Hawk 2003). Several factors influenced 
5. See Kurlantzik and Mason (2006) for an analysis of the legal reasons why this Chinese claim is unfounded. 
the severity of the actual punishment meted out to North Koreans who were caught attempting to leave 
or who have been forcibly repatriated. Those who are classified as “political offenders” face the most 
severe penalties. Individuals believed to have crossed the border with the purpose of defecting or seeking 
asylum in a third country were subject to a minimum of five years of “labor correction.” In “serious” 
cases, defectors or asylum seekers were subjected to indefinite terms of imprisonment and forced labor, 
confiscation of property, or death. Those who did not appear politically dangerous were sent to a village 
unit labor camp, where they spent between three months and three years in forced labor. 
Regulations under the 2004 penal code appear to have codified the differential treatment between 
economic refugees and those cases deemed political. A defector who is sent back to North Korea is subject 
to interrogation and investigation by the City or Country Security Agency. If the agency concludes that 
the defector crossed the border for economic reasons, the new code stipulates sentences of up to two 
years of “labor correction.” The government has even signaled the promise of a pardon under the 2004 
penal code, and several NGOs operating in the region have confirmed that punishments seem to be less 
severe than in the past. On the other hand, defectors believed to have crossed the border for political 
reasons can be charged with the crime of treason and are still vulnerable to longer-term detention (Kim 
2006). However, interviews with 30 refugees conducted between 2005 and 2007 suggest that such 
judicial proceedings are often skipped, torture remains prevalent in detention facilities, and death rates in 
incarceration remain high (Muico 2007). In 2008 there have been reports of public executions, including 
the February execution of 15 people in Onsung County. It has also been claimed that as of March 1, 
2007, the sentence for unauthorized exit has been increased from that specified in the 2004 penal code 
revision (Good Friends 2008). 
Women face an additional set of risks. The North Korean regime has taken a particularly dim view 
of marriages between North Korean women and Chinese men.6 Repatriated women who are suspected 
of becoming pregnant in China have been subject to forced abortions, and infanticide has been practiced 
(Hawk 2003). The legal code changes also specify relaxed treatment for pregnant women, though in 
practice these protocols are breached, and in some cases forced abortions continue to be practiced (Lee 
2006; Michael Sheridan, “Nation Under a Nuclear Cloud: ‘Racially Impure’ Children Killed,” Sunday 
Times, October 15, 2006). Moreover, the North Korean authorities have been unwilling to accept the 
repatriation of children from marriages to Chinese men (a practice that has also created a particularly 
acute problem with respect to orphaned North Koreans in China). As a result, women who are repatriated 
risk not only incarceration but also separation from their children. 
6. See, for example, the April 26, 2006 Rodong Sinmun reproduced on the website of the Korean Central News Agency, April 
28, 2006, “Rodong Sinmun Censures Theory of ‘Multiracial Society,’” www.kcna.co.jp (accessed January 13, 2008). Chinese 
authorities have more practical concerns about intermarriage, although it has also been reported that local authorities have issued 
various forms of official identification documents to North Korean women in rural areas where marriageable women are in short 
supply (S. Lee 2007).
The risks of leaving North Korea are by no means limited to interdiction by North Korean 
authorities but rather rest largely on the position that the Chinese government has taken with respect 
to the refugees (Kurlantzick and Mason 2006). Although China is a party to the Refugee Convention, 
it has consistently taken the view that the North Koreans are “economic migrants” and thus not 
afforded protection under the convention. According to the South Korean Unification Ministry, a 
secret agreement was signed between China and North Korea in the early 1960s governing security in 
the border area. In 1986 another bilateral agreement was signed calling for the return of North Koreans 
and laying out security protocols. Since 2001, surveillance along the border has intensified. Following a 
number of incidents in which North Koreans entered foreign embassies and consulates seeking asylum in 
2002, Chinese authorities forcibly repatriated tens of thousands of North Koreans, and there are concerns 
that in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese authorities will crack down again. In addition to 
the risks associated with treatment by North Korean authorities, there are credible reports of torture in 
the Chinese detention facilities as well (Amnesty International 2000, 2001, 2004; Lee 2006, 53). 
III. LEAVING NORTH KOREA, COMING TO CHINA
The act of migration requires resources and planning and is rarely done without some kind of support, 
be it from friends, family, or experienced traffickers motivated by financial gain, political conviction, or 
religious fervor. Such networks and connections enable refugees to leave in the first place and provide 
support on the other side of the border. Three-quarters of respondents reported receiving assistance 
getting out of the country. Of these more than half reported that they had paid for assistance, suggesting 
that bribery of officials and/or networks of professional smugglers play a large role in escape. Although 
it is believed that missionaries and NGOs are playing a major role in the underground railway, their 
importance appears to be relatively minor with respect to initial egress; barely 1 percent of the sample 
reported NGOs as a source of assistance.
Once they get to China, however, the nature of the support network naturally changes. The survey 
asked whether people received help from Korean-Chinese, missionaries, or others. The overwhelming 
majority (88 percent) reported receiving help from the Korean-Chinese community directly. These 
patterns of assistance are also seen  where the refugees live. Approximately 76 percent of refugees reported 
living with Korean-Chinese. Another 5 percent cite “missionaries,” most of whom come from within the 
Korean-Chinese community as well. Over 5 percent reported living in the mountains or on the street. 
An important question is the stability of the North Korean community in China and their 
intentions with respect to staying, moving to third countries, or going back to North Korea. A striking 
finding of our survey was that 32 percent of our respondents had been in China for three or more years 
(table 1). For most migrants, residence in China, where our survey was conducted, is not their ultimate 
goal: It is a temporary residence until they can assemble the resources to continue on to some preferred 
location for permanent settlement. Yet while most migrants do not want to reside permanently in China, 
their “transitional” stay often proves protracted. 
There are statistically significant differences across genders in the duration of residence in China. 
Nearly 41 percent of women had been in China for more than three years, but only 23 percent of men 
had. This may reflect the fact that some women had married Chinese men or entered into gender-related 
forms of servitude. Alternatively, the disproportionate numbers of women among long-term residents 
of China (who would have exited North Korea during the famine period) might reflect the well-known 
“demographic advantage”: that women are more likely to survive severe food shortages and famine and 
hence a relatively high share of women crossed the border during that period (Macintyre 2002). In either 
case, as we will show in more detail below, greater time in China neither improved psychological state, as 
an “adjustment” interpretation might suggest, nor reduced it, as an “exploitation” interpretation would 
indicate.7 
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF REFUGEES:  THE PREVALENCE OF DISTRESS
A growing clinical literature has established that the particular difficulties faced by North Korean refugees 
have been associated with major psychiatric disorders, including post-traumatic stress disorder (Jeon 
2000, Lee et al. 2001).8 Controlled clinical studies by doctors working with North Korean refugees in 
South Korea found few of their patients to be free of psychological disorders, with rates of PTSD ranging 
from 30 percent (Jeon et al. 2005) to 48 percent (Baubet et al. 2003) to 51 percent partial PTSD and 26 
percent full PTSD (Kim, Yoon, and Han 2007).
Table 2 provides an overview of the responses to our questions about psychological state, grouped 
into three clusters of questions: those dealing with anxiety and fear; those dealing with other psychological 
issues, particularly anger and capacity to concentrate; and those related to refugees’ perception of the 
future. Table 3 displays the mean responses on these questions and the standard deviation.9 
7. Both effects could also be operating simultaneously, with the null finding reflecting our inability to distinguish among 
subgroups within our sample.
8. Interestingly, the duration of such disorders may actually be lower among refugees than among internally displaced people: 
Individuals who became refugees faced similar traumatic events but usually of shorter duration because they were able to escape 
(Cardozo 2003). There is no reason to believe that the experiences of North Koreans in China should differ in this regard. 
However, it is important to note that psychological trauma is a durable and constituted state. Individuals are typically not cured 
without treatment, as illustrated by the high prevalence of patients with trauma who have been in South Korea for some time. 
9. In the interests of brevity, we report results for only a subset of the survey questions. The full set of results is reported in 
Chang, Haggard, and Noland (2006).
Our survey indicates that a majority of North Korean refugees in China exhibit significant 
psychological distress, findings consistent with those obtained by Lee et al. (2001) for a smaller group 
of subjects. Among the questions asked, mean scores are highest for those relating to the anxiety of their 
status: usually anxious, bad things will happen, and fear for family. The descriptive statistics also suggest 
differences between men and women on this cluster of questions, with women showing greater incidence 
of fear and anxiety; we probe this more systematically in the regressions in the next section. 
Clearly, the sources of this anxiety are multiple and encompass events in North Korea that pushed 
refugees across the border, the stresses associated with the trip itself, as well as conditions in China 
once refugees arrived. To get at the immediate causes of stress, we asked the refugee respondents the 
main reason for their anxiety; the answers to these questions are reported in table 4. Their lack of status 
in China was an overwhelming source of anxiety: Approximately 67 percent identified fear of arrest 
and repatriation as their biggest concern, while another 15 percent identified the related concern over 
uncertainty about their residence. The second most reported reason for their anxiety is for their family in 
North Korea (16 percent).10 
There is some evidence of differential responses according to gender. Almost from the moment 
they cross the border—and sometimes when they are still in North Korea—refugee women are subject 
to multiple sources of trauma. Respondents in one survey of 100 female refugees in China conducted 
between August 2001 and October 2003 reported experiences including arrest (44 percent), extradition 
(34 percent), human trafficking (24 percent), rape (20 percent), and prostitution (9 percent) (Kang 
2006).11 Indeed, as shown in table 4, women are more likely to trace their anxiety to fear of arrest than 
men, who show more concern with respect to their residence. While our survey did not probe directly 
into whether women had been involved in trafficking or prostitution, respondents were asked if they 
knew of women being trafficked in China, and 53 percent answered affirmatively. Interestingly, hunger is 
not a widely reported source of contemporaneous concern, at least among North Koreans who have made 
it to China. 
However, it cannot be assumed that the sources of psychological distress are related only to the 
immediate experiences of refugee life in China. The respondents were also asked a battery of questions 
10. Operating in a clinical setting in South Korea, Jeon et al. (2005) found that the most frequently cited trauma among this 
sample while in China was “fear of risk to life if discovered while in hiding” (83 percent), anxiety about being in a strange place 
(81 percent), with family-related concerns also prominent.
11. Marriage brokers provide North Korean women as wives, particularly in the rural areas, where the historical preference for 
male babies has led over time to an acute shortage of marriage-age Chinese women. Having a Chinese husband, however, may 
or may not guarantee a North Korean woman’s safety, as she is still subject to repatriation. Moreover, some women sold into 
Chinese families suffer physical, sexual, mental, and emotional abuse against which they have very little recourse because of their 
status. Other studies have documented that some women resort to prostitution as a source of income (Human Rights Watch 
2002, 12–15; Amnesty International 2004, 28; Muico 2005; Kang 2006; Lee 2006). In addition, North Korean women also 
suffer abuse from Chinese guards along the border and North Korean officials upon repatriation (Anthony Faiola, “North Korean 
Women Find Life of Abuse Waiting in China,” Washington Post, March 3, 2004).0
about their experiences in North Korea, including whether they lost family members to the famine, 
whether relatives were arrested, about separation from their families, whether they had been incarcerated, 
and about their experiences while in prison. 
These experiences are harrowing. More than 23 percent of men and 37 percent of women reported 
having had family members die of hunger. More than 40 percent of the respondents were unaware of the 
international food aid distribution effort; of those who were aware of it, less than 4 percent believed that 
they were beneficiaries. When asked about the disposition of the aid, most expressed the belief that the 
aid went to the military (90 percent) or party and government officials (27 percent).12 
Twenty-three percent of the respondents reported separation from adult family members. In 
59 percent of these cases, this was associated with family members crossing the border into China; the 
second most cited reason was disappearance after traveling without permission (table 5). Disappearance 
for speaking out against the regime was relatively rare (2 percent). Seventy-nine percent of the sample 
reported separation from children. In 66 percent of these cases, the children were left behind in North 
Korea; in nearly 19 percent of the cases, however, children had died due to hunger or illness.13
More than one-quarter of the sample reported having been arrested, and nearly 10 percent of 
the respondents reported having been incarcerated in political detention facilities. While there were no 
statistically significant differences in self-reported arrest rates across genders, males were significantly more 
likely to report incarceration in political detention facilities than were females. Among those incarcerated 
in political detention facilities, 90 percent reported witnessing forced starvation, 60 percent reported 
witnessing deaths due to beating or torture, 27 percent reported witnessing executions (table 6). It has 
been alleged that pregnant women thought to be carrying binational children have been subject to forced 
abortions or infanticide; 5 percent of the respondents indicated that they had witnessed these practices. 
Lastly, it has been claimed that North Korea conducts medical experiments on prisoners;14 55 percent of 
the respondents believed (but did not necessarily witness) that this had occurred at the facilities in which 
they were incarcerated.
12. This does not prove that aid was used in this fashion, only that the respondents believe this to be the case. However, this 
pattern of beliefs is mirrored in a survey of 250 refugees in South Korea conducted by an NGO founded by North Korean 
refugees. According to this survey, 60 percent of the respondents believed that South Korean rice aid was allocated to the military 
on a priority basis, and only 7.6 percent believed that they themselves were recipients. See Baek Seung-joo, “S. Korea Knew Its 
Rice Feeds N. Korean Military,” available at http://english.chosun.com (accessed on February 20, 2008).
13. The way that this question was administered permitted only a single response—it is quite possible that the causes of 
separation occurred systematically more frequently than reported in table 8.
14. Barbara Demick, “North Korea’s Use of Chemical Torture Alleged,” Los Angeles Times, March 3, 2004; Abraham Cooper, 
“Toxic Indifference to North Korea,” Washington Post, March 26, 2005.
V. MODELING PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS
Insight into the sources of psychological distress can be gained by modeling the survey responses as a 
function of the respondents’ demographic characteristics and self-reported personal experiences (table 
7).15 We group the psychological responses—as we have in tables 2 and 3—into three broad categories: 
anxiety and fear (anxious, fear, fearfamily); other psychological problems (anger, concentrate), and 
orientation toward the future (attain, hope). Apart from basic demographic characteristics, with which 
we begin, five experiential variables appear to be highly correlated with these dimensions of self-reported 
psychological status: the status of knowing of food aid but believing that one was not a beneficiary (food 
aid); incarceration in a political detention facility (camp), which also captures in part the experiences in 
the prison system that we have outlined;16 arrest (arrest); knowledge of human trafficking (trafficking); and 
death of a family member due to hunger (death). 
Beginning with the most basic demographic variables,17 age is a statistically significant correlate in 
five of the seven regressions, in all cases being associated with more negative psychological status. This is 
particularly true with respect to the questions dealing with orientation toward the future; not surprisingly, 
advancing age is correlated with a greater sense of hopelessness and despair about reaching life objectives.
Education tended to increase fear and anxiety but did not have effects on other psychological 
problems noted or on orientation toward the future. Despite the correlation between occupation and 
educational attainment, elementary remained significant in all three of the fear and anxiety questions, with 
low levels of education being associated with less fear and anxiety. 
Occupational status (trader, student, farmer, other job) is frequently correlated with psychological 
state. Traders showed a significantly higher level of psychological distress, and across all questions, than 
workers (the omitted occupational category). Farmers—perhaps because of their lack of other skills—did 
show a more despairing outlook toward the future. The migrations of the relatively small number of 
traders may reflect more idiosyncratic, specific, and personal experiences. Trading was often illicit and 
thus highly vulnerable in North Korea and was subject to a variety of idiosyncratic risks in China as well. 
15. Given the skewness of the sample and the likely violation of the normally distributed error term assumption underlying 
standard ordered probit estimation, the regressions reported in table 1 were estimated semi-nonparametrically with the order 
of the Hermite polynomial used to approximate the density of the error distribution set at 3 in all specifications in accord with 
maximum likelihood tests and the Schwartz Bayesian information criterion; the Akaike information criterion, “which in some 
cases is found to have a tendency towards the selection of models with too many parameters, even asymptotically” tended to be in 
agreement with the other two criteria (Stewart 2003, 8).
16. Little or no additional explanatory power was obtained by entering variables associated with having witnessed torture, 
executions, and the like while in the camps; there is a high degree of multicollinearity across these variables, and for these 
respondents, the values of the left-hand-side psychological variables tend to cluster at the most negative node.
17. It is also worth mentioning the dogs that did not bark: Various specifications of variables relating to provincial origin were 
uncorrelated with psychological outcomes and are not reported.
Stories of deals gone bad are not uncommon; a typical scenario involves an individual North Korean 
trader cheated by his or her Chinese counterparty and left in limbo, unwilling or unable to return to 
North Korea to face retribution from creditors. In contrast, one can imagine a situation in which the 
farmers’ migration was essentially a class phenomenon driven by broadly deteriorating conditions, 
involving if not mass then group defections, linking to more extensive social networks in China through 
which the farmers can draw solace and support from similarly situated refugees. Conversely, students had 
the most hopeful future orientation. 
Despite statistically significant differences in many of the responses, gender was significant in only 
two of the seven regressions once other factors are taken into account. Nonetheless, we did find that 
women experienced higher anxiety and fear for other family members than men, reflecting their particular 
vulnerabilities. 
An important finding, however, is that the impact of these demographic variables was dwarfed 
by the experiential ones. Death of a family member due to hunger (death) and knowing of the food aid 
program but believing that one was not a beneficiary (food aid) were significant in all seven regressions; 
these experiences were strongly associated with adverse psychological outcomes. Incarceration in political 
detention facilities (camp) and knowledge of trafficking in women (trafficking)—an experiential variable 
that captures knowledge of a particular risk—were significant in six of the seven regressions. Arrest was 
significant in four of seven cases, including both questions relating to future orientation.
But perhaps the most compelling result in table 7 is the magnitude of the psychological effect of 
famine-related experiences in North Korea and exposure to the North Korean penal system. In all seven 
regressions, the largest estimated coefficient of the five experiential variables is famine-related. In six of 
the seven cases, the coefficients on food aid are estimated with the largest values of any of the experiential 
variables (though not always by a statistically significant margin), consistently larger in magnitude, for 
example, than the coefficients on having been incarcerated in a political detention facility. The only 
case in which food aid is not estimated with the largest coefficient, the concentrate regression, the largest 
estimated coefficient is on the variable for having family members die due to hunger, death. The famine 
and the government’s mismanagement of it continue to reverberate through North Korean society and 
appear to remain important determinants of psychological distress long after the famine had passed and 
the individuals in question had left the country. 
VI.  EXPERIENCES IN CHINA AND FUTURE ASPIRATIONS 
The vast majority of North Korean refugees in China do not want to return to their country of origin 
(table 8). This reluctance to return to North Korea is particularly striking given the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of respondents—90 percent—reported still having family there and many have 
returned, in some cases on multiple occasions. Among our respondents, 20 percent had returned to 
North Korea of their own volition. More than a quarter of the sample had been repatriated, and of those, 
25 percent (83) had been repatriated twice and another 15 percent (49) had been repatriated three or 
more times; in these cases, even imprisonment was not a deterrent. Again, this pattern is consistent with 
a substantial minority of respondents reporting multiple border crossings in a previous survey (Lee et al. 
2001, table 1).
When asked if they planned future returns, the only group with a markedly higher propensity to 
return was students (31 percent), although “student” may be a proxy for age and physical condition. We 
asked refugees their reasons for returning to North Korea, and the overwhelming majority cited the effort 
to bring money (80 percent) or food (11 percent) back to North Korea; only a very small share returned 
to do business or because they found prospects in China bleak. At least among this sample of refugees, 
the phenomenon of return appears to be largely limited to short-term visits by young people bearing 
remittances.
Most refugees in China do not seek to reside there permanently (table 8). Only 14 percent of 
refugees stated that China was their preferred final destination, although this may well be the result of 
the country’s current stance toward the refugees; if China were to loosen its stance, it might well become 
more attractive. As of now, however, the vast majority of refugees would prefer to be elsewhere. 
Given China’s unwillingness to countenance asylum claims, on-migration implies an arduous 
journey via a third country for the majority of refugees seeking permanent resettlement elsewhere. For 
many this means seeking employment in China to accumulate resources for on-migration. Yet only 22 
percent of the refugees reported being employed. Low levels of employment reported by the refugees may 
stem from a multiplicity of factors including fear of detection or lack of skills, including language skills as 
well as psychological state. 
Exploitative work conditions may reinforce such impediments. To be able to work in China, 
one needs a hukou (residence permit) or a shenfenzheng (ID card), which North Koreans cannot obtain 
legally. The lack of papers places the North Koreans at the mercy of employers willing to employ them 
illegally. These conditions invite exploitation and have pushed refugees into low-wage “dirty, difficult, 
and dangerous” work, a common circumstance for refugees (Lankov 2004, Lee 2006). The survey asked 
whether the respondent was receiving a fair wage, and only 13 percent of the 1,152 responding said 
they were; 78 percent reported receiving little wages, and 9 percent reported receiving none. (An often-
reported example of the last case is farm workers, who are denied wages after being promised that they 
would be paid after the harvest.) Admittedly, fairness is a subjective concept. Nevertheless, given that real 
wages and their purchasing power are unquestionably higher in China than in North Korea, the finding 
that 7 out of 8 respondents believe that they are being treated unfairly is striking. 
We would like to model the ability to secure employment in China, and, implicitly, the ability to 
subsequently accumulate resources and on-migrate. The problem immediately arises as to how to treat 
the impact of psychological distress on employment: Anxiety, inability to concentrate, and despair are all 
potential determinants of the ability to secure and maintain employment, yet lack of employment may 
itself cause psychological distress. 
Statistically, this means that right-hand-side regressors may be determined endogenously or that 
the regression is subject to reverse causation. In principle, this can be addressed through the use of 
instrumental variables—namely variables that are highly correlated with the regressor in question but that 
cannot independently causally explain the left-hand-side variable, often because they are chronologically 
predetermined. In the case of the jobs regression, we use events in North Korea (the status of knowing 
of food aid but believing that one had not received it; separation from family members, which cannot 
influence one’s employment in China except through psychological impact) as instruments for the 
average psychological score derived from the seven indicators reported in table 2 (avgpsych). This two-
stage probit regression is reported in the first column of table 9.
Psychological distress strongly impedes employment in China. Indeed, it is one of only a handful 
of variables strongly correlated with employment. Although difficult to tease out in a statistical sense, the 
data are certainly consistent with the interpretation that adverse circumstances in China and psychological 
state are mutually reinforcing: Vulnerability creates psychological problems, which in turn magnify the 
problems refugees face in coping with their difficult environment. 
Interestingly, length of time in China is also negatively associated with employment. There are at 
least two possible interpretations. One is that we are sampling from a subpopulation that for whatever 
reason (unrecorded physical disability, for example) has essentially become stuck in the border region, 
unable to hold down a job, accumulate resources, and move on. The other interpretation is that this 
group has become integrated into the Korean-Chinese community and does not need employment to 
survive. The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive.
In contrast, having child dependents encourages employment, presumably because of greater need 
for income. None of the other demographic variables matter once these are taken into account. The only 
other significant correlate with employment is knowledge of trafficking; it is positively associated with 
employment. 
As reported in table 8, the two most frequently identified preferred destinations for permanent 
resettlement are South Korea (64 percent) and the United States (19 percent). The question of where 
refugees would like to live provides an interesting window both on the nature of the information available 
to them and on their aspirations. The next eight columns of table 9 report probit regressions on the 
preference for those two destinations. 
In contrast to the regressions on psychological status, demographic variables generally appear to be 
more correlated with outcomes than are experiential variables on this issue. The most striking findings 
had to do with education and age. Secondary and postsecondary education were statistically significant 
predictors of the preference to live in the United States in seven of eight cases; in contrast, they were 
negatively associated with a preference for South Korea as the final destination, significantly so in most 
cases. Similarly, age was strongly negatively correlated with a preference to emigrate to the United States, 
and in a couple of specifications, the occupational category student was negatively associated with a 
preference for South Korea. 
Refugees who originated in the three northeastern provinces of North Korea had a distinct 
disinterest in the United States as a destination for permanent resettlement, the only example from our 
analysis in which provincial origins mattered to an outcome. One possible explanation is that refugees 
originating in provinces further from the border represent a more enterprising self-selected group, which 
might be consistent with the notion that younger, better-educated, and possibly more risk-tolerant 
refugees  are interested in migrating to the United States. That said, regional effects were not evident in 
the regressions on the psychological variables. 
A number of experiential variables were correlated with preferences for emigration, though not 
robustly so. Knowledge of trafficking is positively associated with a preference for the United States. 
Camp and death are also positively associated with desire to permanently resettle in the United States 
and negatively associated with interest in South Korea, though these correlations become insignificant 
when other experiential variables are added. The preference for the United States among those formerly 
incarcerated in prison camps may reflect the belief that former political prisoners may have an easier time 
making successful asylum claims in the United States.
In short, the United States is the favored destination for younger, better-educated respondents, 
possibly reflecting better English language ability, less affinity for South Korea, and a greater willingness 
to take risks. Older and less-educated respondents prefer South Korea. 
VII. CONCLUSION
We have reported the results of a highly unusual survey of North Korean refugees in China, emphasizing 
not only the sources of their vulnerability but also the psychological consequences of the difficult journeys 
they have undertaken. The survey confirms that refugees face a particular set of vulnerabilities that range 
from their insecure legal and personal status, risks of deportation, to difficulties in securing livelihoods. 
Our survey also provides evidence that refugees—and particularly women—are additionally vulnerable to 
predatory behavior and trafficking. 
That these vulnerabilities would have a pronounced effect on the mental health of refugees is not 
surprising; an overwhelming number of those interviewed struggle with anxiety and fear. However, the 
multivariate regressions indicate that the psychological problems facing refugees are not simply a result, 
or even primarily a function, of their vulnerability in China but rather point to their experiences in North 
Korea prior to exit and treatment by the North Korean authorities: first and foremost, perceptions of 
unfairness with respect to the distribution of food aid, the death of family members during the famine, 
and incarceration in the North Korean gulag. 
The responses help understand the growing political groundswell to address the North Korean 
refugee problem. The vulnerability of these refugees is clearly related to the Chinese government’s 
position that they are economic migrants, not eligible for protection under existing international 
protocols, and even susceptible to deportation, incarceration, and gross human rights violations. Since 
the time of this survey, there is evidence that the Chinese have intensified their crackdown on North 
Koreans in the country, probably with somewhat contradictory effects. On the one hand, the crackdown 
has almost certainly contributed to a slowdown in the number of refugees entering China and to the 
return—either voluntary or forced—of substantial numbers of those in the country. On the other hand, 
the crackdown may have intensified the vulnerabilities outlined here with respect to those who have 
chosen to stay.
Despite their hardships, it is important to recall that the refugees we have interviewed chose to flee 
North Korea because they believed conditions in China were better than those in North Korea. Few have 
chosen to go back, and those who do have done so on a temporary basis. Moreover, there is little evidence 
among this group that they seek to permanently return to North Korea. While it is important to focus 
international attention on the particular plight of the refugee, it is also important to recall that the refugee 
problem is only the very small tip of a much larger iceberg of deprivation and repression within North 
Korea itself. 
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Table 1    Length of time in China
Males Females Total
Period Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Less than  months   .   .0        .
 to  months  .  0.  .
 to  years 0 . 0 .0 0 .
 to  years  .  .0  .
More than  years  .  0.  .0
Total   00.0   0 00.0   , 00.0










Usually anxious .0 . .0 .0 . .
Bad things will happen to me . .0 . .0 . .
Fear for my family 0. . . . . .
Always in fear . .0 . . . .
Other psychological problems
Get angry easily  . . 0. . . .0
Hard to concentrate . . . . . .
Future orientation
Not sure of future . 0. . . . .
Not able to reach goals . 0. . . . .
Current situation is hopeless . .   . .   .0 .










Usually anxious . 0. . 0. .0 0.
Bad things will happen to me . 0. . 0. . 0.
Fear for my family . 0. . 0. . 0.
Always in fear .0 0. . 0.0 . 0.
Other psychological problems
Get angry easily  . .0 . .0 . .0
Hard to concentrate . 0. . 0. . 0.
Future orientation
Not sure of future . 0. . 0. . 0.
Not able to reach goals . 0. . 0. . 0.
Current situation is hopeless . 0.   . .0   . 0.
Table 4    Reported reasons for anxiety
Males Females Total
Reason Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Arrest  .  .  .
Hunger  .  0.  0.
Home  .  .  .
Family in North Korea 0 .  .  .
Others  0.  0.  0.
Total 0 00   0 00.0   ,0 00.0





If yes, why? 
Speaking against the regime  .
Traveling without permission  .
Crossing the border to China  .
Stealing food  .0
Don’t know  .
Total  00.0




Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Sent to labor camp/political prison
No  .  . , 0.
Yes  .  .  .
Total  00  00 , 00
If yes, did you witness the execution of prisoners?  
No  .  .  .
Yes  .  .  .
Total  00  00  00
If yes, did you witness forced starvation? 
No  .  .  .
Yes  .  . 0 0.
Total  00  00  00
If yes, did you witness death due to torture/beating?
No 0 .  .  .
Yes  .  0.  0.
Total  00  00.0  00
If yes, did you witness the killing of infants?
No 0 .  .  .0
Yes  .  .  .0
Total  00  00  00
Prisoners sentenced to death are used for experimentation
No  .  .  .
Yes 0 .  .  .
Total  00    00    00
Table 7    Psychological state of North Korean refugees (semi-nonparametric estimation
                   of extended ordered probit)
Variable Fear and anxiety
Other psychological 
problems Hope for the future
anxious fear fearfamily anger concentrate attain hope
food aid 0.*** 0.*** 0.*** .00*** 0.*** .*** .0***
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.)
camp 0.*** 0.** 0.*** 0.0** 0. 0.*** 0.***
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.)
arrest 0.0 0.* 0. 0.* 0.0 0.0*** 0.**
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.) (0.0) (0.0)
trafficking 0.*** 0.*** 0.*** 0.** –-0.0 0.0*** 0.***
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.0)
death 0.*** 0.*** 0.*** 0.*** 0.*** 0.*** 0.***
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.) (0.0) (0.0)
female 0.** 0.0 0.* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
age 0.*** 0.0 –0.0 0.*** 0.*** 0.*** 0.***
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
elementary –0.*** –0.*** -0.*** –0.0 0.0 –0. –0.
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.0)
farmer –0.** –0.* -0.0 0. 0. 0.** 0.***
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
trader .* 0. 0.0 .0** .*** .*** .***
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (.0) (0.) (0.)
student 0.*** –0. –0. –0.*** –.0*** –0.0*** –0.***
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.) (0.) (0.)
other job 0.** 0. 0. 0. –0.0 –0.0** –0.*
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.)
N ,0 ,0 ,00 ,00 ,0 ,0 ,0
Chi-squared . . .0 . . ,00. ,.
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8      Preferred destinations for permanent
                      resettlement 
 Destination Number Percent
North Korea  .0
South Korea 0 .






Table 9    Job in China and preferred final destination
Job in China Prefer to live in the United States Prefer to live in South Korea
Variable 2SPLS(1) US-P(1) US-P(2) US-P(3) US-P(4) SK-P(1) SK-P(2) SK-P(3) SK-P(4)
avgpsycha –.***
(0.)
food aid 0. 0.
(0.) (0.)
camp 0.0 0.** –0.* –0.**
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.)
arrest 0. –0.0
(0.) (0.)
trafficking 0.*** 0.*** 0.0*** –0. –0.
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.0)
job in China 0.0 0.*
(0.) (0.)
death 0.00 0.* –0. –0.**





female 0.0 –0.0 0.0 –0.0 –0.0 –0. –0. –0.0 –0.0
(0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
northeast 0.0 –0.** –0.*** –0.** –0.*** 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.0)
Pyongyang 0. 0. 0. 0.0 0. –0. –0. –0. –0.
(0.) (0.0) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.)
age 0. –0.*** –0.*** –0.*** –0.*** 0. 0. 0.0 0.0
(0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.)
secondary 0.** 0.*** 0.*** 0.*** –0.* –0.0*** –0.** –0.**
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.) (0.0)
post-secondary 0. 0.* 0.* 0.* –0.0* –0. –0. –0.
(0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.)
elementary –0.
(0.)
farmer 0.00 –0. –0.0 –0. –0. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
trader –0.0 0. 0. 0. 0. –0.0 –0.0 –0. –0.0
(0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
(table continues next page)
Table 9     (continued)
Job in China Prefer to live in the United States Prefer to live in South Korea
2SPLS(1) US-P(1) US-P(2) US-P(3) US-P(4) SK-P(1) SK-P(2) SK-P(3) SK-P(4)
student –0. –0.0 –0. –0.0 –0. –0. –0. –0.* –0.*
(0.) (0.0) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.)
other job 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. –0.0 –0.0 –0. –0.
(0.) (0.0) (0.) (0.0) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.) (0.)
Regression summary statistics
N  ,0 ,0 , , ,0 ,0  
Pseudo r-squared 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chi-squared 0. .0 . . .0 0.0 .0 . .
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
a. Instruments = food aid, family members missing, disappeared, or abducted
Notes: Job in China is estimated using two-stage probit least squares (SPLS), preferred final destination is estimated using a probit (P) model.
Standard errors in parentheses.